Finally, he derives, from the failure of these arguments, a unique metaphysical thesis, which he calls 'non-theoretical physicalism'. Here it is: Introduction; Y. There is no need to deny that Mary is physically omniscient: every philosopher knows that she is not. In other words, the greatness of God can be compared with the greatness of all other possible beings such as humans, aardvarks, and escalators. Nagasawa's egregious mistake is repeated in his definition of physical omniscience p.
This book warns against a religion based upon chance, deficient science, and deficient atheistic evolution as opposed to theistic evolution. He proposes novel objections to Thomas Nagel's and Frank Jackson's well-known 'knowledge arguments' against the physicalist approach to phenomenal consciousness by utilizing his own objections to arguments against the existence of God. He provides a scientific model that steers between scientific materialism and religious fundamentalism; a model that has implications for how we live both individually and collectively. As you'll see at his page and his , he's working on a book-length treatment on the existence of God, entitled, The Existence of God: From Anselm to Big Bang Cosmology under contract with Routledge. Making a connection between the prototypical No Knowledge Argument and the atheological no knowledge arguments is not as far-fetched and artificial as one might think at first sight. Richard Dawkins would hate it, which is always good evidence for proper, scholarly acuity which he seems only to be able to do in Biology, any higher study is a struggle for him, poor boy.
Nagasawa is a very clear and original thinker. The more popular arguments from design such as irreducible complexity in Biology are displayed as they are seen by academia - weak arguments, with the modal ontological argument correctly displayed as the far more respected argument for Gods existence. Note that this last sentence is the third -- the tacit -- premise of the Knowledge Argument in counterfactual form. If one reads Nagasawa benevolently which, note, I am not unwilling to do , then one can take him to be rejecting the third premise of the Knowledge Argument in counterfactual form, which premise states a matter of possibility, not of actual fact. Here, M is the set of propositions that Mary knows, G the set of propositions that God actually knows, P the set of true physical propositions, D the set of true propositions that God can in fact know, and T the set of true propositions. That the falsity of Jackson's assumption has such consequences is rather questionable in itself.
This requires the development of appropriate first-person, second-person and third-person methods. Reprinted in Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa eds. Modern advances in molecular biology, 'cosmic' mathematics, and the psychology of atheism have vanquished atheism's intellectual and psychological raison d'etre. What are the various arguments that seek to prove the existence of God? According to Nagasawa, these three problems are really aimed at The Omni God Thesis, and not perfect being theism. In one of history's great ironies, the birth of the New Atheism has brought about the beginning of the end of atheism as a legitimate intellectual position.
Find out more - our page has information about doctoral research at the University of Birmingham. In Nagasawa's book, this well-known knowledge argument of the philosophy of mind is connected with less-known other knowledge arguments as Nagasawa calls them , namely, with certain atheological arguments in the field of the philosophy of religion, arguments which attempt to demonstrate the non-existence of God by pointing out that God's omniscience is incompatible with His other traditional perfections where, of course, it is presupposed that the possession of all traditional divine perfections is necessary for the existence of God. A being is intensively superior to other beings if it has the great-making properties to a higher degree of intensity than other beings. But if physicalism is true, then Mary would be omniscient simpliciter if she were physically omniscient, even though she were at the same time subject to conditions that allowed her to have experiences only in a rather limited way. He has recently written an intriguing book, , recently reviewed at Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, which critiques prominent a priori arguments for dualism, such as Thomas Nagel's and Frank jackson's. Through the perception that God is sustaining one in being, for example, one can justifiably believe that God is indeed sustaining one in being. It is possible that A and B.
Alston offers a detailed discussion of our grounds for taking sense perception and other sources of belief—including introspection, memory, and mystical experience—to be reliable and to confer justification. Not every true physical proposition can be expressed in a language of theoretical communication i. By appealing to this structure, Nagasawa constructs novel objections to Jackson's and Nagel's arguments. As in other areas of science, the investigation of consciousness aims for a more precise knowledge of its phenomena, and the discovery of general truths about their nature. Winner of the 2010 Excellence in Philosophy of Religion Prize. Finally, he derives, from the failure of these arguments, a unique metaphysical thesis, which he calls 'non-theoretical physicalism'.
Can atheists refute these arguments? Physicalists will of course deny the necessity of the no-experience-no-knowledge nexus; dualists will of course assert it. In God and Phenomenal Consciousness, Yujin Nagasawa bridges debates in two distinct areas of philosophy: the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion. What Nagasawa calls Type-A arguments focus on the internal coherence of one divine attribute. Through this thesis, he shows that although this world is entirely physical, there are physical facts that cannot be captured even by complete theories of the physical sciences. June 28, 2018 Nagasawa, Yujin. By appealing to this structure, Nagasawa constructs novel objections to Jackson's and Nagel's arguments. Category: Philosophy Author : G.
I discovered his work while researching the problem of omniscience and first-person indexicals doxazotheos. It is an ideal introduction to philosophy of religion and an excellent starting point for anyone interested in arguments about the existence of God. Chapter 2 of Maximal God examines the claim that God is the metaphysically greatest being. He also examines the way in which mystical perception fits into the larger picture of grounds for religious belief. Finally, he derives, from the failure of these arguments, a unique metaphysical thesis, which he calls 'non-theoretical physicalism'. He proposes novel objections to Thomas Nagel's and Frank Jackson's well-known 'knowledge arguments' against the physicalist approach to phenomenal consciousness by utilizing his own objections to arguments against t In God and Phenomenal Consciousness, Yujin Nagasawa bridges debates in two distinct areas of philosophy: the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion. And he tells us p.
I hasten to add that, as far as I can see, these errors of formulation lead to no errors of thought in Nagasawa's interesting book. I don't believe he has. In contrast, the second premise of the Knowledge Argument in counterfactual form is evidently true. Harter Languange : en Publisher by : Lulu. Yujin Nagasawa specialises in the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of mind and applied philosophy.
But, as I noted before, no philosopher believes that Mary is physically omniscient anyway. The parody arguments are intended to have the same structure as the ontological argument, but they have premises that entail absurd conclusions. He then presents a parallel structure between these arguments and influential arguments offered by Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson against the physicalist approach to phenomenal consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. Howard-Snyder A Participatory Model of the Atonement; T. So, a perfect being theologian can affirm both theses; but she need not, if there are problems with The Omni God Thesis. This leaves us with ii.